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Abstract. Normative organisations use norms to guide and constrain agent be-
haviour in order to facilitate cooperation. Norms and their associated enforcement
strategies are chosen to further organisational goals, but the effect that a norm has
upon organisational performance may change over time in a dynamic environ-
ment and behaviour that is desirable in one environment may come to be harmful
in another. In this paper we seek to answer the question — how can an organ-
isation detect when a norm is no longer supporting its goals? Specifically, how
can it monitor the impact of a norm upon its performance? This paper has three
contributions: first, we detail a model which relates an organisation’s norms to
its performance, second, we propose a mechanism for monitoring the impact of a
norm upon that performance using a simulation approach, and finally we describe
an implementation of our mechanism.
Keywords: norms, normative organizations, organisational performance, monitoring,
simulation
1 Introduction
In organisations, agents work together to achieve goals that are difficult or impossible
to achieve by a single agent alone. Cooperating agents within an organisation can solve
problems with distributed resources, data or expertise, as well as long term problems in
timescales beyond the life of an individual [5]. However, this cooperation can be com-
plex to orchestrate, especially as the number of agents increases. In particular, agents
may interfere with one another while performing actions, or come into conflict over
shared resources.
Norms have been proposed as a solution to these coordination problems [9], and
constrain agent behaviour by prohibiting, or obligating, certain actions or states of af-
fairs. Autonomous agents may violate norms in exceptional circumstances, when the
benefits outweigh the costs of punishment, so a normative organisation may be more
flexible and robust in the face of unexpected problems, such as environmental changes.
Conflicts may thus be reduced and goal achievement facilitated without rigid rules.
This follows the example of the use of norms within human organisations as a means
of management control over employee behaviour in order to improve organisational
performance [22]. However, the design of norms is complex and challenging [21] with
behavioural controls leading to unintended consequences (as Merchant notes in human
organisations [16]). Offline design of norms allows an organisation to select its ini-
tial norms [21], but if the environment is dynamic or largely unknown at design time,
norms may come to have different practical effects from their designed purpose, so that
the impact of the norms may change. This effect has been noted and studied in human
organisations [23].
The problem of norms becoming counter-productive is considered by Boella et al.
[2], who take the view that each norm is designed with an intended goal in mind, much
like a plan, and that in each situation the norm must be interpreted to determine if it
furthers that goal. They propose a logical framework to allow such interpretation, either
by an agent choosing whether to comply with a norm, or by an enforcement mechanism
deciding whether to sanction a violation. This interpretation makes use of constitutive
norms that specify counts-as rules for variables that make up the regulative norms.
While the approach is a valuable way to ensure that the effect of norms remains true
to their intended purpose, it relies on agents (or the enforcement mechanism) having
the capability and knowledge to perform such reasoning. Moreover, it does not concern
itself with the situation where changing circumstances render the intended purpose of
the norm itself harmful to the organisational performance. It is this latter problem that
we seek to address in this paper — how can an organisation detect when a norm is no
longer supporting its wider goals? More specifically, how can it monitor the changing
impact of a norm over time in a dynamic environment?
This paper thus has three contributions. First, we propose a model of norm im-
pact that links organisational norms to organisational performance. Second, we detail a
mechanism to monitor norm impact within an organisation. Finally, we implement our
mechanism and show how it reveals a change in impact in a dynamic environment.
As a motivating example, we use a mobile distributed sensor network (MDSN):
specifically, a group of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) undertaking a search and res-
cue task in which they seek to locate victims and report their locations to a control
centre [11], described in Section 2. The model of organisational performance and norm
impact is then detailed in Section 3, and the monitoring mechanism is described in Sec-
tion 4, where we consider how to determine what is required in order to monitor norm
impact within an organisation, and propose a method to do so. In Section 5 we describe
an implementation of the norm impact monitoring system and present results. We finish
with a review of related work in Section 6, and conclusions in Section 7.
2 The Scenario: UAV Search and Rescue
In order to motivate and illustrate our work, we adopt a search and rescue scenario in-
volving an organisation using a team of UAVs to search for hidden victims. The organ-
isation consists of a static controller and five mobile agents (representing the UAVs)
who play the roles of team leader and sensors. The environment is represented by a
grid of 50x50 cells in which some are open ground while others contain either bushes
or trees. The sensors traverse the environment searching for victims, but their range of
detection is limited to the cell they occupy and to adjacent cells.
If a victim is found, a sensor sends its location to the team leader and the informa-
tion is relayed to the controller which keeps count of located victims. Another victim
then appears at a random location, so that at any time there are always 6 hidden victims.
Organisational performance is measured by the cumulative number of victims located.
A single norm (avoidTrees) prohibits a UAV from flying below 50 metres in a cell
containing trees. As well as punishment for norm violation, flying low over trees gives
a small risk of crashing, resulting in an agent being disabled for 80 time steps. If agents
comply with the norm, they will not crash. The probability of a sensor detecting a victim
depends on the contents of the cell (open, bush or tree) and the altitude of the sensor
(flying low increases the probability). This is high in open ground, lower in bushes and
even lower in trees. Over trees there is thus a tension between flying low to increase the
chance of detecting a victim and flying high to reduce the chance of crashing.
The probability of crashing depends on conditions that can change over time, so
it is possible that the usefulness of the norm to the organisation may also change. For
example, on a calm, clear day, a UAV is able to fly at a low altitude over trees with barely
any chance of crashing, and in such an environment the norm may harm performance
by obliging it to fly high unnecessarily. In contrast, on a windy day, flying low makes
a crash very likely, and the norm may greatly benefit performance. Note that in both
cases, the goal of the norm (to stop UAVs crashing) has not changed, merely its impact.
It is this change in norm impact that we seek to detect.
3 A Model of Organisational Performance
The term organisation encompasses many different types of multi-agent groupings,
from hierarchies for specific tasks to loose congregations with common interests [13].
There are several well-established organisational models in the literature (e.g. MOISE
[12]) but, in order to maintain generality as far as possible, we do not use an existing
one here. However, since we are concerned with the impact of norms upon organisa-
tional performance, we do have some requirements. In particular, we are concerned with
organisations with three characteristics: they have explicit, measurable goals; they com-
prise agents playing roles, each with defined responsibilities and tasks, so as to achieve
those goals; and they use norms as a flexible means to guide and constrain behaviour.
With these characteristics in mind we represent an organisation as a tuple:
O = 〈G,R,N,A,Mem, rwd〉, where G is the set of goals, R is the set of roles, N
is the set of organisational norms, A is the set of agents within the organisation, Mem
is the organisational memory and rwd is the reward function that the organisation uses
to measure its success at achieving its goals. We define these elements in the following
sections.
3.1 Organisational Goals and Roles
Organisations can be seen as goal-directed systems designed to solve problems that
are too large (either spatially or temporally) or too complex to be solved by individual
agents [5]. In this work, we specifically concern ourselves with organisations that have
a set of explicit goals, G, such that success at meeting those goals can be measured by
a reward function, rwd. A goal in this context is a state of affairs that the organisation
wishes to achieve or maintain. This requirement is driven by our need to measure the
performance of the organisation, which we consider in Section 3.5.
A role can be seen as a building block of an organisation, representing some ser-
vice or function that must be performed by it, and related to other roles by interaction
and authority relationships [8]. Designing organisations using roles allows the designer
to abstract away from specific agents and instead impose goals and norms onto roles
rather than individuals. During the operation of the organisation, these roles are filled
by agents who seek to achieve the goals under the constraints of applicable norms.
3.2 Organisational Norms
We take norms to be obligations, prohibitions and permissions that constrain and guide
behaviour [15, 1]. We consider prohibitions as negative obligations: one is obliged to
see to it that the prohibited action or state does not occur. In our model, a norm is
represented1 as: n = 〈target, type, content, context, punishment〉 where target
is the role to which the norm applies, type ∈ {obl, per} is the deontic type of the
norm (either obligation or permission), content is the action or state referred to by
the norm, context is a statement of under which circumstances the norm applies, and
punishment ∈ R+ is the penalty for violating the norm. Permissions cannot be vi-
olated, so have no associated punishment. Note that this representation does not con-
sider norms where the punishment is the imposition of a contrary-to-duty norm. Both
content and context are boolean expressions that can be understood by agents playing
the roles, and can thus use environmental variables, internal agent variables, or actions.
For example, a norm, avoidTrees, which prohibits an agent playing a sensor role
from flying below fifty metres in altitude over trees is represented in the following way:
avoidTrees = 〈sensor, obl, altitude > 50, isOverTrees, 35〉 .
Norms apply to any agent playing the targeted role and, if agents play multiple roles,
the norms from all the roles apply. The organisational norm set, N = {n1, n2, ..., ni},
contains the norms used by the organisation. Nri ⊂ N , is the set of norms that apply to
role ri (and hence any agents playing that role). In our UAV scenario, there is a single
norm, avoidTrees, applying to the sensor role, so N = Nsensor = {avoidTrees}.
3.3 Agents
Agents play the roles within an organisation and it is the aggregate actions of these
agents that make up the organisation activity. An agent playing a role in the organisation
commits to try to achieve certain goals at certain times. These goals may be sub-goals
of larger missions performed by multiple agents. We assume that agents are benevolent
towards their organisation, and that they will attempt to achieve their goals. However,
since agents are autonomous, they have leeway in how they achieve the goals. They
may also have multiple goals at any one time and so must decide the order in which to
1 Our representation is a simpler version of Andrighetto’s [1]; we do not include norm defender
or source since norms are imposed by the organisation and self-enforced by agents themselves.
pursue those goals. In this section, we consider how agents within normative organisa-
tions choose which actions to take. We specifically examine BDI agents using offline
planning.
BDI agents [4], such as those using AgentSpeak(L) [19], perform offline planning
using libraries of pre-compiled plans to achieve goals and react to events. To enable flex-
ible plan selection in the presence of norms, we follow the approach of Oren et al. [18],
where each agent has some utility function that it seeks to maximise and in this respect,
achieving goals increases its utility, while violating norms decreases its utility. There
is no requirement for an agent’s utility function to directly relate to the organisation’s
reward function (described in Section3.1), in particular the agent may lack the wider
knowledge required to determine whether its actions are ultimately beneficial to the
organisational goals. Now, since agents are benevolent towards the organisation, they
automatically reduce their utility for norm violations, so in effect punish themselves
rather than rely on external enforcement — they do not wish to evade the consequences
of their violations.
Given this, we can model an agent, a as a = 〈Ga, Πa, Ba, Ra, Ca, P lanSelectiona〉
where Ga is the set of current goals, Πa is the set of available plans, Ba is the set
of agent’s beliefs (including its representation of the environment), Ra is the set of
roles currently played by the agent. Ca is a set of capabilities {c1, c2, ..., cn}, ci =
〈α, comp〉, where α is some action that the agent can perform and comp ∈ [0, 1]
represents the agent’s level of competence at performing the action. The set of plans,
Πa = {pi1, ..., pin} represent the contents of the agent’s plan library. PlanSelectiona
is the set of two functions, selectPossibleP lansa and selectBestP lana that the agent
uses to select a plan from the plan library when deciding upon a course of action.
An agent chooses its plan based upon its current goals, beliefs, capabilities and
norms. Since violating a norm reduces utility, agents prefer to comply with applicable
norms, but if a goal is very important and yields a high utility, then it may make sense
for an agent to violate a norm in order to achieve it.
In order to choose a plan, first the agent generates a set of possible plans,Πpos, using
selectPossibleP lansa(Ga, Πa, Ba, Ca)→ Πap. Then it selects the plan yielding the
highest utility, piNa , using selectBestP lana(Πpos, Ba, Ca, Na) → piNa , where Na is
the set of norms applicable to the agent. Using this method of plan selection, if all else is
equal, the selected plan, and hence the agent’s behaviour, is dependent upon the norms.
3.4 The Environment and Agent Activity
An organisation acts within and upon an environment in order to achieve its goals, and
this activity may change the environment. We must therefore represent this environ-
ment, and also the activity itself. We model the environment as a set of variables, with
each variable referring to a property of the world. At a specific time ti, the environment
is Eti , where e ∈ Eti is an environmental property.
The activity of an organisation is the aggregate actions of all the member agents.
ACorg,N,ti is the organisational activity at time ti and is defined as
ACorg,N,ti =
|A|⋃
j=0
ACaj ,N,ti
where A is the set of all agents in the organisation, and ACaj ,N,ti is the set of actions
taken by agent aj , at time ti, with organisational norm set N .
To represent the changes that an organisation’s behaviour makes upon the environ-
ment we specify an environment transformation function, ET F(EN,ti , ACorg,N,ti)→
EN,ti+1 , where ACorg,N,ti is the organisational activity at time ti using organisational
norm set N , and EN,ti+1 is the environmental state arrived at after one ‘tick’ of activity
by the organisation. Note that the environment may change without the involvement of
agents.
Over a time period longer than a single ‘tick’ (from t0 to tn), if the norm setN does
not change, we can define an extended transformation function:
ET F t0→tn
(
EN,t0 ,
n⋃
i=0
ACorg,N,ti
)
→ EN,tn
where EN,t0 is the environmental state at t0, and EN,tn is the state at tn.
3.5 Organisational Performance and Norm Impact
We are interested in how the norms of an organisation help it to perform its tasks given
a specific environment and set of agents playing its roles. We informally define organ-
isational performance over a time period as the increase in organisational utility over
that period; this may be positive (if utility increases), negative (if it decreases) or zero.
In this section, we consider how an organisation may calculate this performance, and
propose a definition for norm impact.
An organisation’s reward function may not depend purely on the current environ-
mental state, but may also depend on past states and organisational behaviour. To ac-
commodate this we use the concept of organisational memory, a repository of infor-
mation that an organisation updates over time (though simple organisations may not
require such a memory). We denote organisational memory at time ti as MemN,ti ,
where N is the organisational norm set (which has not changed from t0 to ti), and
m ∈ MemN,ti is some variable derived from environmental, organisational or agent
properties over time.
The reward function is defined as rwd(EN,ti ,MemN,ti) → utilityN,ti , where
utilityN,ti ∈ R is the organisational utility, and EN,ti is the state of the environment at
time ti resulting from the activity of the organisation using norm setN (see Section 3.4).
utilityN,ti indicates how well the organisation is performing at time ti using norm set
N . In our UAV scenario, the number of victims found measures the performance of the
organisation over the mission: a higher number indicates better performance.
We define organisational performance over a time period ts to tf as the difference
between the utility values at those times (so long asN does not change over the period):
perfN,ts→tf = utilityN,tf − utilityN,ts
Thus performance is the measure of change in the organisation’s utility from ts to tf .
We define norm impact as the effect of a specific norm upon organisational perfor-
mance. Formally, the impact of norm n between time ts and tf is
impactn,ts→tf = perfN,ts→tf − perfN ′,ts→tf
where N ′ = N \ {n}, and perfN ′,ts→tf is the performance that would have occurred if
the organisation had been using norm set N ′ over the time period. The impact of a set
of norms can also be derived in a similar way.
The challenge is to derive the performance for both norm sets, N and N ′, over
the same time period, since only one norm set would actually be applied within the
organisation at any one time. IfN is the applicable norm set, the performance underN ′
must be estimated. In the remainder of this paper, we describe our proposal to estimate
this performance using a simulation approach.
4 Monitoring Norm Impact
In this section we propose a method to monitor the impact of a norm, n, upon the
performance of an agent organisation. We do not measure norm impact directly, but,
instead, use a simulation approach where the activity of the organisation is modelled
twice: first, using the existing set of organisational norms, N , and then under the norm
set, N ′, where N ′ = N/n. Each simulation starts from the same state derived from the
state of the organisation and environment at a specific time, but with different norms.
First, we specify the process and provide a monitoring algorithm, then we examine the
process in more detail.
4.1 The Monitoring Process
The monitoring entity may be an agent (for example, one playing a monitoring or lead-
ership role), or it may be some program either internal or external to the organisation.
We make no assumptions about its nature, but refer to it as the monitor. The monitoring
process has two stages. First, the monitor captures information about the organisation,
agents and the environment at a single point in time — the snapshot, which is the state
of the system at that moment in time (in Section 4.2 we examine what needs to be in
this snapshot). The monitor uses the snapshot to build a model of the environment and
the agents. In the second stage, the monitor uses these models to simulate agent activity
over the time period required, both with and without the norm of interest. Multiple runs
of each simulation may be needed to get an average performance if the environment is
non-deterministic.
Algorithm 1 shows the monitoring process algorithm for a single time period, from
time ts to tf , of length ‘ticks’. Norm set N ′ is generated by removing the investigated
norm, n, from the organisational norm set, N (line 1). At ts the monitor gathers the
snapshots (lines 4 to 6). Using this information it creates two simulations, simN and
simN ′ , differing only in the norm sets used (lines 7 and 8). The organisational perfor-
mance under each set of norms, pN and pN ′ , is estimated by running the simulation
for the required number of ‘ticks’ to obtain the environment state and organisational
memory at time tf , and then calculating the performance based on the organisational
reward function (lines 9 to 12). Finally, norm impact, impactn, is calculated by a simple
subtraction (line 13).
We choose to create simN and generate pN rather than compare pN ′ directly to the
performance seen in reality for two reasons. First, in a non-deterministic environment,
Algorithm 1 The monitoring process, for a single monitoring period
Require: A multi-agent organisation to be monitored, MAS
Require: Its norm set N
Require: Its set of agents A
Require: Its organisational specification, Org
Require: The norm to be investigated n.
Require: A monitoring time period, mt = 〈ts, tf , length〉
1: Generate norm set N ′ ← N/ {n}
2: while MAS is active do
3: if time = ts (the start of a monitoring period) then
4: Gather snapshot of environment properties, EN,ts
5: Gather snapshot of agent states, ASN,ts
6: Gather snapshot of organisational memory, MemN,ts
7: Create simulation, simN ← createSim(A,EN,ts ,MemN,ts , Org,N,ASN,ts)
8: Create simulation, simN′ ← createSim(A,EN,ts ,MemN,ts , Org,N ′, ASN,ts)
9: Run simulation, EN,tf ,MemN,tf ← runSim(simN , length)
10: Run simulation, EN′,tf ,MemN′,tf ← runSim(simN′ , length)
11: Estimate performance, pN ← rwd(EN,tf ,MemN,tf )− rwd(EN,ts ,MemN,ts)
12: Estimate performance, pN′ ← rwd(EN′,tf ,MemN′,tf )− rwd(EN,ts ,MemN,ts)
13: Calculate norm impact, impactn,ts→tf ← pN − pN′
14: end if
15: end while
a single run of the system may produce a performance that is exceptionally good or bad
due to random chance, and this may obscure the impact of the norms. Using an average
performance derived from multiple runs reduces this effect. Second, by comparing the
performance in the real system to pN the organisation may be able to detect problems
with the simulation models. For example, if pN is very different from the real perfor-
mance (beyond that which could be derived from random chance), it is possible that the
models used to create the simulations are not fit for purpose.
The remainder of this section examines the steps of the process in more detail. In
Section 4.2 we consider the snapshot information and discuss what must be included,
then we discuss the creation and running of the simulations in Section 4.3.
4.2 The Snapshot Information
The snapshots form the initial state of the simulations, as they capture the moment in
time from which the simulated activity begins. The monitor gathers this information
from the multi-agent system (MAS) either directly, or via the organisational agents
themselves. There are three sources of snapshot: the environment, the organisational
memory and the agents. In our model, the environment snapshot at time ts is EN,ts ,
the set of environment variables at time ts. Similarly, the organisational snapshot is
MemN,ts , the organisational memory at time ts. The snapshot of an agent is the state
of that agent at a moment in time, so if the MAS and the simulation use the same
software framework, it may be possible simply to copy the entire internal state of the
agent from the MAS and then use it in the simulation. However, we cannot make this
item description source
selectPossibleP lansa function to select possible plans Agent
selectBestP lana function to select best plan Agent
Ra set of roles played by the agent Agent
Ga set of a’s goals Organisation
N ′a set of norms applicable to a Organisation
Πa set of plans in a’s Plan library Agent
Ba set of a’s beliefs Agent
Ca set of a’s capabilities Agent
Table 1: Information required to simulate agent a’s goal and plan selection
assumption about the nature of the MAS and the simulation without overly constraining
the generality of our work. Therefore, in this section, we consider which parts of an
agent’s internal state must be included in a snapshot in order to simulate its behaviour.
The monitor must simulate the behaviour of the organisational agents during the
monitoring period. First, agents select a goal based on their role, their available plans,
and the environment. Second, they select a plan from the set of those applicable, based
upon the norm set and the environment. Third, they perform the actions from the plan
until the task is complete or abandoned. In our model, we represent the agent’s plan se-
lection mechanism as two functions: selectPossiblePlans and selectBestPlan (see Sec-
tion 3.3); these are the functions that the monitor must simulate. In order to do so under
norm set N ′a, the monitor needs eight pieces of information as shown in Table 1.
Agents within an organisation have goals imposed upon them as a result of their ac-
ceptance of a role; these organisational goals take precedence over any individual agent
goals. Role-based goals are available to the monitor via the organisation’s specification,
so the monitor can obtain Ga. It also has access to the organisational norm set and can
thus derive N ′a, which are the norms applying to a without the norm of interest, n.
The monitor must rely upon the agents to provide the other information. However, in
this paper we assume that most of these elements do not change over the lifetime of the
MAS2. Specifically, we assume that the two selection functions (selectPossibleP lansa
and selectBestP lana), the plan library, Πa, the roles played by the agent, Ra, and its
capabilities, Ca, do not change. The monitor therefore receives this information once
when the MAS starts and uses the same information throughout its lifetime. This leaves
the beliefs, Ba as information that must be provided in the agent snapshot.
If an agent is following one or more plans at time ts, they must be recorded in the
snapshot, because these plans may still be valid and sound under the new norm set. We
should not require the agent to discard an existing plan purely because the norm set
has changed. In the case of a long term plan this could severely harm organisational
performance, though the effect could be minor and acceptable if the plans are short
compared to the length of the time period of the simulation.
An agent may gather percepts from the environment (or other agents) but not pro-
cess them immediately. For example, if an agent able to process a single message per
2 If the agent playing a role changes, then these assumptions may be incorrect — we leave this
for future work.
Algorithm 2 Starting an agent from a snapshot.
Require: Agent beliefs from snapshot Bsnap
Require: Current plan from snapshot pisnap
Require: Agent goals Ga, and agent capabilities Ca
Require: Norm set used in simulation Nsim.
Require: Set of roles played by agent Ra
Require: Agent plan library Πa
1: Ba ← Bsnap
2: Na ← setNorms(Ra, Nsim)
3: pia ← pisnap
4: if not sound(pia, I, Ba) then
5: Πpos ← selectPossibleP lans(Ga, Πa, Ba, Ca)
6: piNa ← selectBestP lan(Πpos, Ba, Ca, Na)
7: end if
8: while true do
9: Continue Agent Activity
10: end while
time step receives multiple messages, then it must store messages until able to process
them. When taking a snapshot of such an agent, we must include those messages in
our snapshot. Likewise, if an agent stores events for future processing, this event queue
must be included, even though these events occurred before ts. Percepts and messages
processed by the agent prior to ts need not be recorded in the snapshot because these
will have been incorporated into the agent’s beliefs and intentions if necessary.
4.3 Creating the Simulations
The direct effect of agent actions is one cause of environmental change, but there are
other causes that must be considered. The actions of agents have a direct effect on the
environment (or agents), but may also cause side-effects on either the environment or
the agents. There may also be an element of environmental dynamism that is unre-
lated to the organisation’s agents. The monitor must thus simulate three aspects: the
behaviour of the agents and their direct effect on the environment; the indirect side-
effects of those actions; and other elements of dynamism unrelated to agent actions.
In order to model indirect changes, the monitor requires a model of the environ-
ment to determine likely side-effects of agent actions upon the environment and also to
simulate changes arising from environmental dynamism. This may include modelling
physical effects (if the MAS exists within a physical environment). For example, in our
UAV scenario the simulation must model the probability of a low-flying UAV crashing
into a tree. Also, it must have a model of other agents sharing the environment with the
organisation, so that their actions can be simulated.
Starting a simulation from a snapshot requires the agents to begin in media res, that
is, as if they were in the middle of whatever situation they were in when the snapshot
was taken. Algorithm 2 shows the required steps for an agent starting from a snapshot
— beliefs and the current plan are derived from the snapshot, and the set of applicable
norms are generated from the new organisational norm set, Nsim and the set of roles
Table 2: Scenario Parameters
(a) Detection probabilities
Cell Probability
Terrain (fly low) (fly high)
open 1.0 0.7
bush 0.8 0.4
tree 0.5 0.1
(b) Plan properties
Plan Properties Weight
success reward
searchHigh 0.1 40 4.0
searchLow 0.5 5 2.5
played by the agent, Ra. The agent must determine whether the current plan is sound
(possible and desirable), and if not then it reconsiders its course of action.
4.4 Calculating Performance and Norm Impact
Once the simulations (simN and simN ′ ) have been created, the next step is to run them
and calculate the organisational performance. As in Algorithm 1, each simulation is run
over the time period of interest (ts to tf ) and the simulated environmental state and
organisational memory at the end of the run are used in the reward function to calculate
organisational utility at time tf under both norms sets, N and N ′. If the environment
is non-deterministic, then multiple runs may be performed and an average utility cal-
culated for each norm set. Performance is then calculated by subtracting the starting
utility (which is calculated from the snapshot information). Finally, the norm impact is
calculated by subtracting the performance under N ′ from the performance under N .
5 An Implementation of the Monitoring System
To evaluate our monitoring mechanism, we implemented a monitoring system for our
UAV scenario (described in Section 2). In this section we describe our implementation
in a broad fashion, but for reasons of brevity and clarity have omitted much of the detail.
A MAS representing our UAV scenario was built using the Jason AgentSpeak frame-
work [3]. It consists of a single controller and five sensor agents, one of the latter also
plays the team leader role. The sensors have a library of plans allowing them to search
the environment as a team, coordinated by the controller and team leader. The victims
are also agents. As described above, the probability of detecting a victim located in a
cell varies with terrain type and altitude, shown in Table 2a.
We do not implement a full normative plan selection mechanism as described by
Oren et al. [18], but instead the sensors have two plans for searching a tree-filled cell,
one compliant (searchHigh) and one that violated the norm (searchLow). The plans are
annotated with two properties, success and reward, to reflect the probability of success-
fully searching a cell, the reward for doing so, and the reward reduction for violating a
norm. The reward is set to a value of 40 and the punishment for violating the norm is
set to 35. The success property is determined by the values in Table 2a.
The plan selection function, selectBestPlan uses weights derived by multiplying
the plan properties, success and reward to give an expected reward for following each
Table 3: Environmental properties
Environment Crash probability Delay time
Low Crash 0.005 80
Mid Crash 0.05 80
High Crash 0.1 80
plan (see Table 2b). The agents then choose the plan with the highest weight. Given
these weightings, agents choose to comply with the norm since the expected utility
gain is higher from the compliant plan. The organisational performance over a time
period is measured by the number of victims located during that period. For example,
if at time t1, 6 victims have been found, and at time t2, 11 victims have been found,
the organisational performance is 5. This count of located victims is performed by the
controller, so we do not use an explicit organisational memory.
In order to implement Algorithm 1, we first need to create snapshots of the environ-
ment and agents. The environment snapshot is a file generated by Jason that records the
environmental state at the start of the monitoring period. To generate the agent snap-
shots, we use a new Jason internal action3, dumpState, to record an agent’s beliefs and
message queue in a file. This internal action is performed as part of a plan triggered at
the start of each monitoring period.
The simulations were also built using Jason, with the environment and the agents
reading in the snapshot information at the start of the simulation. A new internal action,
bootstrap, allows an agent to copy the beliefs and message queue from the snapshot,
and a plan is triggered on start-up to restart agent activity based on beliefs (specifi-
cally, the point reached in traversal of the area, and whether currently disabled due to a
crash). One simulation uses the avoidTrees norm, the other does not — implemented
by changing the reward property for the searchLow to 40 (to represent the absence of a
penalty). Each simulation is run 100 times, and the organisational performance calcu-
lated from the number of victims found over the period.
5.1 Experiments and results
The MAS ran for 3000 time steps and norm impact was monitored over periods of 500
time steps, beginning respectively at time 500, 1500 and 2500. We performed experi-
ments to represent three environments differing in the probability of a UAV crashing
if flying too low over a tree: a high crash, low crash, and varying environment. The
consequences of a crash were the same in all environments; Table 3 details the values
of these properties. The varying environment began as a high crash one until time 1251,
then became a mid crash environment until time 2251 when it became a low crash one.
Snapshots of the system were taken at time 500, 1500 and 2500, and used as the
basis of simulated activity both with and without the norm, avoidTrees. Norm impact
over the monitoring period was then calculated, with results displayed in Figure 1. The
norm had a positive impact in the high crash environment and a negative impact in the
3 Jason internal actions are Java functions that allow agents to perform actions not related to
their environment, such as writing to a log file.
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Fig. 1: Impact of norm avoidTrees in different environments over three time periods
low crash environment. In the varying environment, norm impact begins positive, but
changed to become negative as the probability of crashing reduces. These results show
that it is possible to quantitatively measure norm impact and to measure the change of
this impact as the environment changes. An organisation using such a monitoring mech-
anism is thus able to detect when a norm is becoming less useful, or indeed harmful, to
its overall goals.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
The two main approaches to the design of norms are offline design [21] (where norms
are designed prior to execution), or an emergent approach where satisfactory norms
are converged upon by agents through a learning process [20]. Both have problems
for situations in which an organisation wishes to use norms to regulate behaviour in a
dynamic environment. With an offline approach, norms are designed for a specific range
of environments, and if the environment changes sufficiently then norms may become
unsuitable. An emergent approach can cope with a changing environment, but by its
very nature the organisation has little control over the norms that arise, and the learning
process can be lengthy. Our approach allows the impact of norms designed offline to be
monitored, so that poorly performing norms can be identified and replaced.
Centeno and Billhardt propose an adaptive normative system that tailors incentives
to individual agents [6]. Their work provides a way to modify norms that are no longer
useful because they are violated by agents since the incentives can be modified to en-
sure that agents will comply. However, they do not consider situations where compli-
ance with a norm is itself detrimental to the organisation. Boella et al. do consider this
situation [2] by using the concept of norm goals, where each norm has an associated
intended goal, and provide a logical framework with which an agent can reason about
the desirability of compliance. However, this does not detect if the goal of the norm
becomes detrimental, and raises the need for possibly sophisticated agent reasoning.
Regarding organisational performance, Centeno et al. provide a formal model of a
normative organisation that includes the notion of a useful regulative system (or nor-
mative system) as one that improves organisational utility [7]. However, they do not
quantify the effect of particular norms on organisational performance, instead consider-
ing the normative system as a whole, whereas our work specifically looks at individual
norms. Dignum and Dignum investigate the fitness of an organisation’s structure to
its task [10] and propose a simulation approach to determine the effectiveness of that
structure. We likewise use a simulation approach, although we focus upon the normative
aspect of an organisation rather than its structure.
Norm monitoring within the literature has focused upon compliance issues (for
example, [17]), rather than determining whether a norm is effective. With respect to
changing norms to improve organisational performance, Koeppen et al. propose and
implement a method to select efficient norms using case-based reasoning [14]. Their
approach builds up a library of cases to select the best norm to improve simulated traf-
fic flow in a multi-agent system, based on organisational goals.
7 Discussion and Further Work
We have presented a model that links the norms of an organisation to its task perfor-
mance. The model considers the plan selection mechanism of the agents and how this
selection is influenced by applicable norms. This in turn affects the actions taken by the
agents in pursuit of their goals, and hence the changes in the environment that lead to
the organisational goals being achieved, or not. We proposed a mechanism to enable an
organisation to monitor the impact of norms upon performance over time, and imple-
mented it using a scenario based upon a team of UAVs undertaking a search and rescue
mission. Our experimental results showed that it is possible to quantitatively measure
this impact, and to measure the change of impact as the environment changes.
Our scenario is simplistic, with a single norm and only limited reasoning by the
agent about whether to comply or not. A more sophisticated implementation could in-
clude agents using local knowledge to determine whether it is valuable to violate a norm
and hence investigate the tension between organisational norms intended to encourage
long-term success and agent decisions geared toward short-term success.
In addition, in an organisation with multiple norms it may not be feasible to monitor
the impact of every norm and possible subset of norms using our approach4, so we need
a method to decide which norms to monitor. Possible approaches include: assessing
how sensitive a norm’s impact is to environmental change, and then monitoring those
most sensitive; grouping norms according to the roles and tasks to which they apply,
and monitoring those applying to the most critical tasks.
Finally, it is important to note that the quality of the impact estimation is tied to
the accuracy of the simulation. In a real world UAV scenario, it may be challenging to
adequately model factors such as system failures and probability of victim detection.
4 In a MAS with n norms, there are potentially 2n combinations that could be monitored.
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